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The Tractatus is a book that presents a dilemma to 
its reader. The dilemma can be described briefly in the 
following manner: what is written in the Tractatus will 
appear possible to understand to a careful reader. But at 
the end of the book, in 6.54, the author declares that “his 
propositions” are to be recognized as nonsensical. The 
reader who thinks that he has reached a reasonable 
understanding of the Tractatus is thus left with the 
realization that he has in fact failed in his attempts to do 
so. Put in an even more compact manner: although the 
Tractatus might seem possible to understand, we are not 
supposed to be able to, according to its author. One way of 
dealing with the dilemma is to try to make nonsense into 
something more than just plain nonsense. It can be done 
by amending the ordinary meaning of the term “nonsense” 
in such a way that understanding and gaining insight from 
the nonsense of the Tractatus does not represent any 
direct conflict with Wittgenstein’s statement in 6.54.    
James Conant is preoccupied with criticizing this 
kind of solution to the Tractatus-dilemma, or at least that is 
how it seems. He has presented a reading according to 
which there is “only one kind of nonsense; mere 
nonsense”, and he refers to this conception of nonsense 
as the “austere conception” (Conant 2000 p.191). The 
claim that there is exclusively “mere” nonsense makes it 
natural to assume that Conant’s approach will result in a 
solution to the dilemma of a radically different character 
than the one outlined above. The name “austere 
conception” indicates that Wittgenstein will be taken very 
seriously and perhaps literally, when using the term 
“nonsense” in the Tractatus. We might also expect 
willingness on Conant’s side to deal with whatever 
consequences that may follow from this radical approach. 
While trying to get a grip on Conant’s interpretation, I 
started to suspect that such expectations would not be 
met. In this paper I will discuss two solutions to the 
dilemma: one briefly outlined in my introductory remarks 
and the solution presented by Conant. My main focus will 
be on the latter.  
Conant uses the term “substantial conception of 
nonsense” when speaking of the first kind of solution. 
According to its proponents there are two types of 
nonsense; 1) “substantial” or “illuminating” nonsense and 
2) “misleading”, “bad” or “mere” nonsense (ibid. pp.176-
177, 191). The most important function of the first type is to 
serve the purpose of conveying insight into matters that 
cannot be spoken of with meaningful propositions 
according to the Tractatus. The second type of nonsense 
has no such function (Conant 2000 p.191). According to 
Conant, some proponents of this approach are confused 
about the tractarian distinction between “saying” and 
“showing”: They think the distinction should be applied not 
only to use of language that satisfy the criteria of 
meaningfulness found in the Tractatus, but also to 
“illuminating” nonsense which, according to them, show 
ineffable aspects of reality (ibid. pp. 178-179). This allows 
for some nonsense, viz. the propositions of the Tractatus, 
to be elucidatory via their ability to convey insight. The 
problem of how nonsense is able to form part of a 
cognitive process, leading to “the throwing away of the 
ladder”, will thereby be prevented from arising.  
Conant presents an alternative solution based on 
the “austere” conception of nonsense. The main principle, 
as I understand it, is that there is only one kind of 
nonsense from a logical point of view, “mere nonsense”: 
utterances or combinations of words where no logical 
syntax is discernable (ibid. p.191). In view of the central 
role logic plays in the Tractatus, defining nonsense as 
language use where no logical syntax can be found 
precludes it from the realm of cognition and rationality. The 
Tractatus-dilemma is therefore especially acute to the 
austere reading; nonsense has in a radical way been 
excluded from what is possible to understand or gain 
knowledge from. Having pointed this out, I suggest that we 
consider the two following questions: 1. What is meant by 
the term “nonsense” in the Tractatus? 2. What status do 
the propositions found in the Tractatus have?  
Proponents of the “substantial” conception of 
nonsense can be seen as concentrating on the first 
question: Their solution to the dilemma is given under the 
assumption that Wittgenstein in 6.54 is referring to the 
whole of Tractatus - all of its propositions are declared 
nonsensical (give or take the Preface). This demands an 
adjustment of the meaning of “nonsense” in order to avoid 
the dilemma; hence they focus on the question of what is 
meant by this term by Wittgenstein. I will now try to make it 
clear how Conant’s solution can be seen as focusing on 
the second question listed above. It will now be of use to 
be reminded of what Wittgenstein says in 6.54: 
“My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he 
who understands me finally recognizes them as 
nonsensical, when he has climbed out through them, on 
them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the 
ladder after he as climbed up on it.) He must surmount 
these propositions; then he sees the world rightly.” 
(Wittgenstein 1986)1 
Interpreting this remark as Wittgenstein declaring 
that all the propositions of the Tractatus are nonsensical is 
a mistake according to Conant - Wittgenstein is only 
referring to some of its propositions, (Conant 2000 p.216). 
Conant presents guidelines as to how we can decide to 
which category a remark belongs: The main principle is 
found in a distinction between the remarks that form “the 
frame of the work” and those that belong to “the body of 
the work”. The former type has the role of “preparing the 
way” for the remarks that form part of “the body of the 
work” (ibid.). The latter type of remarks function elucidatory 
in that they are to be recognized as nonsensical, and are 
what Wittgenstein is referring to as “nonsensical” in 6.54, 
according to Conant. It is important to note that deciding to 
which category a remark belongs cannot be based on any 
intrinsic properties of the remark itself. Conant claims that 
it will depend on “the kind of sense a reader of the text will 
[…] make of it” and on the “sort(s) of aspect it presents” to 
a reader in such a way that it “will depend on her – on the 
use(s) to which she is drawn to put it in the course of her 
ascent [up the ladder].” (ibid. p. 217).  
In the solution offered by Conant, the propositions 
of the Tractatus are thus divided into different categories. 
                                                     
1 I have amended C.K. Ogden’s translation since it ignores the difference 
between “unsinnig” and “sinnlos” in this remark. 
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He explicitly tells us that understanding some of the 
remarks of the Tractatus as sinnvoll is a presupposition for 
achieving the elucidatory purpose of the work as a whole. 
Only in so far as we can understand the “instructions” 
offered by the remarks that belong to the frame of the 
work, are we able to reach the philosophical goal 
illustrated by the metaphor of the ladder in 6.54 (ibid. 
p.216). It should now be clear that Conant can be seen as 
focusing on the second question that was introduced 
earlier: What status do the propositions found in the 
Tractatus have? If we connect this question to the 
Tractatus-dilemma, we could say that instead of making 
distinctions within nonsense, Conant introduces 
distinctions within the remarks of the book. Naturally, the 
question of what Wittgenstein means by “nonsense” is also 
central to his discussion. Briefly, his answer goes as 
follows: By “nonsense” Wittgenstein means language use 
where “no method of symbolizing has yet been conferred 
upon a string of signs”. It is implied in this formulation that 
we have not given any meaning to an utterance or to some 
of its parts (Conant 2002 pp. 403-4).  
Now, I suggested that Conant makes distinctions 
within the propositions of the book instead of making them 
within nonsense. It is however not at all clear that this is an 
adequate way of putting it: We have learned that the 
arbiter of what kind of role a proposition has in the 
Tractatus, according to Conant, is the reader. Decisions on 
the status of propositions in the Tractatus appear to be an 
individual matter – what is nonsense to me might not be 
nonsense to you. The reason why we should differ, as I 
understand it, is connected to the difference in degree or 
character of the philosophical confusions we are suffering 
from. In a pre-tractarian stage we will be under different 
illusions that the Tractatus is aiming at liberating us from 
(Conant 2000 p.196-197). As a consequence, answers to 
the question of which propositions serve an elucidatory 
role will vary from reader to reader. Let’s look at a passage 
from Conant’s text: 
“[…] the Tractatus is not concerned to argue that 
there are no ways to distinguish between kinds of 
nonsense – or even that there is no distinction to be drawn 
in the neighborhood of the distinction sought by the 
proponent of the substantial conception (i.e. one which 
marks off cases of “philosophical” nonsense from (other) 
cases of mere nonsense – but only that there are no 
logically distinct kinds of nonsense […]. The coherence of 
the entire procedure of the work, indeed, rests upon the 
assumption that there is a distinction to be drawn [..] the 
Tractatus takes it to turn on psychologically distinct kinds 
of nonsense.”(ibid. p. 209) 
It is evident here that according to Conant there 
are in fact distinctions to be drawn within nonsense. He 
mentions “philosophical” as opposed “to (other) cases of 
mere nonsense” and claims that what makes his reading 
different from the “substantial” conception of nonsense is 
that there are “psychologically distinct kinds of nonsense”, 
but not “logically distinct” kinds. We must also look at 
another passage:  
“Question: which sentences are (to be recognized) 
as nonsensical? Answer: those that elucidate […] Not 
every sentence of the work is (to be recognized) as 
nonsense. For not every sentence serves as an 
elucidation.”(ibid. p. 216) 
When these passages are seen together, we may 
conclude that what distinguishes “philosophical” nonsense 
from other kinds of nonsense, within the category of “mere” 
nonsense, is that it serves an elucidatory purpose. It 
should be clear from the passages above, that if asked 
whether all nonsensical use of language qualify as 
elucidatory, Conant’s answer would be negative: there’s 
potentially “elucidatory” nonsense and there’s complete 
nonsense - without the potential to play any elucidatory 
role. Let’s take a new look at the Tractatus-dilemma.  
My starting-point consisted of two different 
solutions to the dilemma of 6.54 in the Tractatus. The first 
solution, based on the “substantial” conception of 
nonsense, tried to escape the problem of how we appear 
to understand the sentences of the Tractatus, whilst the 
author tells us that they are nonsensical, by introducing 
different kinds of nonsense. The solution presented by 
Conant was on the other hand introduced, as an approach 
according to which there are no distinctions to be made 
within nonsense and hence no help to find in adjustments 
of the meaning of the term itself. Conant seemed instead 
to turn to a division of the sentences of the Tractatus, so 
that it would be legitimate to understand some of them, but 
in accordance with 6.54 to recognize others as 
nonsensical. As it turned out however, Conant makes use 
not only of distinctions within the remarks of the Tractatus; 
distinctions within nonsense are also part of his solution to 
the dilemma. A difference between the two solutions is 
instead found in the way some nonsense serve an 
elucidatory purpose – not in the reliance on distinctions 
between types of nonsense. According to the “substantial” 
conception, elucidatory nonsense shows ineffable aspects 
of reality that may help us gain the insight necessary to 
“see the world rightly”. According to the “austere” reading 
the very recognition that certain cases of language use 
result in nonsense is the aim of elucidation in the Tractatus 
(ibid. p. 198). We must however add that this applies only 
to “philosophical” cases of “mere” nonsense. Another 
difference from the substantial conception is the 
introduction of distinctions within the remarks of the 
Tractatus; Conant claims that we must take some of the 
remarks as “sinnvoll”. Our impression that we have 
understood at least some of the remarks becomes 
unproblematic since we are supposed to be able to 
understand them. Hence a suitable conclusion to my 
discussion would be to say that the name “austere 
conception of nonsense” does not reflect an approach to 
the dilemma according to which there are no distinctions to 
be drawn within nonsense. I wish, however, to add two 
comments to the picture we have reached. They concern 
aspects of Conant’s solution to the dilemma that might 
conceal a tension in the guidelines he offers to an 
understanding of the work. 
We have been told that whether a remark in the 
Tractatus is found to be nonsensical or not depends on the 
role it has in the work for a particular reader. If the reader 
realizes that it is nonsensical it has served an elucidatory 
purpose, helping the reader in the ascent up the ladder. 
This in turn is related to facts concerning the character of 
the philosophical confusion the reader is entangled in. In 
giving this account Conant is opposing interpreters who 
think that it is possible to find out by examining a string of 
words whether it is a specimen of nonsense or not. He 
claims that it is a misunderstanding to presuppose “that 
certain strings of signs are intrinsically either cases of 
Unsinn or cases of Sinn” and that questions of 
nonsensicality “depend on us” (ibid. p. 216). He further 
claims that “[t]here can be no fixed answers to the question 
of what kind of work a given remark within the text 
accomplishes” (ibid.). At the same time, however, he 
provides examples of remarks that belong to “the frame of 
the work” and must be recognized as sinnvoll (ibid. Conant 
mentions the Preface, §§ 3.32-3.326, 4-4.003, 4.111-4.112 
and 6.53-6.54.). One would expect that this is the sort of 
interpretative move that cannot be made according to his 
reading; Conant’s acting as the voice-over of the Tractatus 
stands in contrast to his own account of how questions 
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about the status of particular remarks must be settled by 
the individual reader of the work. 
My second comment concerns the claim that there 
are psychological distinctions to be made within nonsense 
according to the Tractatus, while no logical distinctions are 
possible to make. I think it is reasonable to connect this 
claim to Conant’s account of how it depends on us whether 
we recognize a remark in the text as nonsensical and that 
there will, as a consequence, be variation between 
different readers on these matters. What will stop one 
reader from realizing that a remark is nonsensical, as 
opposed to another, will be the specific misunderstandings 
of “the logic of our language” he is suffering from. A 
successful reader will eventually realize which of the 
remarks of the Tractatus Wittgenstein is referring to in 
6.54, and that they are nonsensical. The aim of 
Wittgenstein’s philosophical project will then be achieved. 
Since the only kind of distinctions within “mere” nonsense 
Conant allows for are psychological distinctions, we must 
assume that whether a remark in the Tractatus (which is 
part of “the body of the work”) is recognized as nonsense 
or not, depends on psychological facts about the reader 
and on the psychological effects a remark has on him.  
It is of importance here that Conant emphasizes 
that the early Wittgenstein adheres to Frege’s three 
principles from The Foundations of Arithmetic, the first of 
which reads: “always to separate sharply the psychological 
from the logical, the subjective from the objective” (Frege 
1989 p.X, Conant 2000 pp.180, 189). Part of the 
assumption of a strong continuity between the two 
philosophers in this respect is that the notion of a thought 
in a strict logical sense is seen as operative in the 
Tractatus (ibid. pp. 193-4). These factors lead to a wide 
gap between what is psychological and what is 
logical/cognitive. Conant’s claim that only nonsensical 
remarks are potentially elucidatory commits him to an 
account of “elucidation” as belonging to the psychological 
realm. It is therefore reasonable to describe how 
elucidation functions in the Tractatus according to Conant 
in the following way: The starting-point is a person in a 
certain psychological state which is caused by exposure to 
philosophical texts and to the nonsensical remarks of the 
Tractatus. These remarks are of a psychologically distinct 
kind and trigger a process within the reader; he goes 
through a certain “experience” (ibid. p.197) resulting in the 
removal of the confused state as he realizes that some of 
the remarks in the book are nonsensical. Only after having 
gone through this “experience” is the attainment of a 
certain intellectual state possible, that of “seeing the world 
rightly” (6.54). Conant argues that philosophy, as practiced 
in the Tractatus, depends on the reader going through this 
psychological process of elucidation (ibid. pp.196-197). 
This might appear to be in order in view of e.g. 4.112: “A 
philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations.” But 
it becomes difficult to account for remarks that bespeaks a 
very different conception of philosophy, such as 4.1121: 
 “Psychology is no nearer related to philosophy, 
than is any other natural science.” 
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